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BOOK REVIEWS.
STARE DECiSiS, RES JUDICATA, AND OTHER SELCTED ESSAYS. By Robert von
Moschzisker. Cyrus M. Dixon, Philadelphia, 1929. Pp. vii, 375.
The Supreme Bench in the several States is now gradually coming to be a
seat of learning and of intellectual independence. The examples of a Holmes
and a Dillon and a Cooley have long ceased to be unique. Twenty years ago the
present writer published some sour comments on the ignorance of the judges;
in particular, referring to the valuable articles in the current legal periodicals,
the comment declared "there is little or nothing in judicial opinion to show that
these articles have ever been read." And yet in that short period of twenty
years, a change is perceptible. Judges, indeed, are now found to be even authors
of articles in law reviews; therefore they must be readers of them!
Chief Justice Moschzisker's judicial opinions have long been noticeable
for their outstanding qualities of legal learning, acute analysis, and lucid exposi-
tion. It was natural that he should be given opportunities, by the editors and by
the bar associations, to reach a wider audience than the readers, of the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court Reports. This volume assembles a selection from his
various essays and addresses.
The topics include: "Stare Decisis," "Res Judicata," "Presumptions as to
Foreign Law," "The Common Law and a Federal Jurisprudence, .... Federal
Equity Jurisdiction," "Briefs in Appellate Courts," "Amending the Federal
Constitution," "Judicial Review of Constitutionality of Legislation," the
"American Bar Association in London," the "Old Supreme Court Room in
Philadelphia," and the "Bi-Centennial of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania."
The address on behalf of the visiting American lawyers at the Grays Inn
Dinner, in London in 1924, is a genial and felicitous example of American
postprandial oratory. Incidentally we learn from it that the eminent author's
name (which has bothered us non-Pennsylvanians, for some time past, to pro-
nounce) does not import a purely Kosciuszkan hematogenesis; for on his
maternal side two ancestors were a Scot and an Englishman who came to the
Colonies a century and a half ago; and in the next generation the Moschziskers
will cite a Macbeth and a Macduff among their maternal ancestors!
The address on "A Philadelphia Lawyer" is a worthy tribute to the long
line of eminent advocates and judges who have built up and preserved the repu-
tation of that city and its commonwealth. Andrew Hamilton, Horace Binney,
Edward Tilghman, William Rawle, Jeremiah- Black, John Gibson, David Paul
Brown,-what stirring episodes and notable annals are not recalled by the mere
catalogue of these famous names! The author believes, on the authority of
the late lamented Hampton Carson, that the phrase "a Philadelphia lawyer",
signifying maximal professional shrewdness, first came to be used in 1735, when
Andrew Hamilton was imported from Philadelphia to New York, to defend
Peter Zenger in the celebrated trial for seditious libel. But no specific authority
is given for this; Mr. Carson, says the author, admitted "that his extensive
reading had not furnished an authentic statement on the point." And the
reviewer has somehow formed the impression that David Paul Brown, practis-
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ing as a trial lawyer in the i85o's, was the personage whose extra-State fame
created this homage to "the Philadelphia lawyer." (By the way, who nowa-
days reads "The Forum, that two-volume periodical, which Brown founded /
and edited? It contains some gems of his experience; and also, if memory
serves, his once celebrated Rules of Professional Ethics.)
The technical essays here collected are good examples of what a supreme
judge can do to advance the cause of orderly legal thinking by offering to the
public the systematized results of his lucubrations while deciding particular
cases. The reviewer has never happened to form any opinion on the majority
of the topics treated. 'But on the subject of "Stare Decisis" (the first essay
in this volume) he has had occasion to do some thinking; and in this instance
he records the impression that the learned author has not touched the real
difficulties of the problem.
,John. H. Wigmore.
Northwesterm University School of Law.
CASES ON THE LAW OF CARRRs. By Ralph Stanley Bauer and Edgar Watkins.
Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York, 1928. Pp. xxiii, ix4o.
This recent addition to the collections of cases for the study of the law of
carriers has several points of individuality. From the outset there is a recogni-
tion of the prominence of statute law in the field. This does not mean the elim-
ination of common law cases, but does mean that the importance of well selected
cases containing contrasts and'comparisons with and between statutory and com-
mon law rules has been kept prominently in the foreground. Another feature is
that a large number of the cases are of considerable length and have apparently
been selected with a view to include numerous -citations and extracts from
other cases. A number of the cases, therefore, contain chronological lists of
citations of other cases marking the development or history o.f the principle
or principles applied in arriving at the decision. Thus we find in Part I on the
topic of Regulation of Common Carriers by Government, ioo pages given to eight
cases, out of x6o pages allotted. The main text contains about 225 cases, but the
inclusion of cases containing a large number of citations makes a larger number
of decisions available. A third feature is the selection and editing of cases from
what may be called the practical standpoint. Comments of judges and excerpts
from the examination of witnesses, omitted in most selections of cases, appear in
many cases in this book, apparently for the purpose of getting closer to the
practice by which the results were attained. In some instances these may be
helpful to the student as they were to the court.
The typographical set-up of the book, for which it is presumed the editors
are not responsible, results in a greater bulk than is justified by the contents.
Large type, widely spaced lines and paragraphs, and commodious margins may
leiid to legibility, but add to bulk and might lead one to fear that he could not
cover iioo pages, whereas the material would seem to be nicely adjpsted to the
average time allotted in the curriculum. Appendices contain a large portion of
the Interstate Commerce Act, the Federal Bills of Lading Act, and the Uniform
Bills Of Lading Act. Whether it is well to- include the statutes with the text
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may be only a matter of policy. With the Interstate Commerce Act and related
statutory law available for thirty cents from the Superintendent of Documents,
an appendix for statutes seems hardly necessary and not as readily usable as a
pamphlet which can be used alongside the text.
The editors have pointed out in their preface that Part I, "The Regulation
of Common Carriers by Government," can be used later if desired. This is so
obvious that there seems little justification for placing it first before the con-
cepts of the common carrier or his legal duties and liabilities have been set forth.
Unless this chapter is postponed, the student would be faced with the difficult
question of the conflict between interstate and intrastate rates in the sixth and
seventh cases in the book. The selection of cases and treatment in this Part is
well done and condenses a lot into i6o pages. First come the topics of the
validity and methods of delegation of the regulatory power in interstate com-
merce. Then, through Southern Ry. Co. v. Atlantic Stove Works is pre-
sented a discussion of the powers and authority of a state commission. This
brings the subject naturally to the conflict between interstate and intrastate rates,
and we find the Shreveport Case and the case of Wisconsin R. R. Commission
v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co. presented. Pages 86-ioi are given over to
cases on rate judging and adjustment of rates to conditions and not to distances
alone. The influence of competition on rates is shown in Interstate Commerce
Commission v. Chicago, Great Western Ry. Co. A footnote on page io2 calls
attention to the tenor of the Hoch-Smith resolution, the interpretation of which
recently had so disastrous *an effect on the reappointment of Mr. Esch. An
interpretation of the specific policy of Congress to encourage transportation by
water through the establishment of through routes and joint rates between rail
and water carriers is given to the student in Baltimore and C. S. S. Co. v.
Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co. The procedure in a reparation case, including a
discussion of the wide range of evidence allowed before a commission, seems to
be the justification for the space allotted to Spiller v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry.
Co. The cases, on the whole, are used effectively and show, so far as the brief
treatment permits, how commissions work and how regulation is effected.
Part II, "Who are Common Carriers," indicates its contents and the first
division, "Common Carriers of Goods," is illustrated with cases chronologically
arranged from Allen v. Sackrider, 1867, down to Film Transport Co. v. Michi-
gan Public Utilities Commission, 1927. A typical example of the cases selected
for their content showing the chronological development of the principles in-
volved is Frost v. Railroad Commission of California. The topics, "Who are
Common Carriers of Live Stock," "of Passengers," and "Common Carriers by
Statute," are not extensively developed. It is not especially evident why
Magoffin v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. is the only case under "Who are Pas-
sengers ?".
Part III, "Duties and Liabilities of Common Carriers," covers the bulk of
the text. The standard subdivisions are followed, ranging from "Duty to Serve
All" down to "Connecting Carriers" with space apportioned as the editors
deemed the topic warranted. Under "Liability as Insurers" we find cases from
Christie v. Griggs down to three cases against the Boston Elevated Ry. Co. in
i927. About sixty pages are given to cases on the passenger ticket and rights
thereunder, including Shelton v. Erie Ry. Co.; Frederick v. Marquette, etc., Ry.
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Co., and Wilkes v. Chicago, R. 7 & P. Co. Under "Bills of Lading" the cases
run from The Delaware, i87r, down to the Federal Bills of Lading Act. "Lim-
itation of Liability" furnishes cases from Boston and Maine Ry. Co. v. Hooker
down to the three Lawrence Leather Co. Cases in New York in ig26. "Limitation
of Liability to Passengers" is elaborated in the historical sketch in Missouri, K.
& T. Ry. Co. v. Zuber. We would be disappointed if we did not find the sinking
of the Tokomaru under "Route" and the same is true of John on v. Pensacola and
Perdido R. R. Co. and Ocean S. S. Co. v. Savannah Locomotive, etc., Co. under
"Duty to Serve". "Delivery to the Proper Person" involves a long selection from
Paciftc Express Co. v. Shearer and the topic is brought down to x925 in In re
Taub. The doctrines relating to connecting carriers are traced from Muschamp
v. Lancaster, etc., R. R. Co. down to Oregon and Washington Ry. & Nay. Co. v.
McGinn. It will be seen that the field has been covered chronologically and the
standard cases have not been overlooked. The modern cases used have not been
chosen from any list of outstanding or leading cases, but include many less
known, but equally suitable cases bringing out the principles desired. It is for
this reason, apparently, and because of the intentional selection of cases involving
other citations at length, that such cases as Adams Express Company v. Croninger
appear otherwise than as individual text cases.
The inclusion of the duties and liabilities arising out of the relation of car-
rier and passenger with those arising out of other types of carriage does not
seem to justify itself. It necessitates, under the topic "Beginning and End of
the Carrier's Relation": first, a presentation of the cases illustrating the begin-
ning of the carriage of goods; second, a change to the beginning of the carriage
of persons, i. e. the formation of the relation of carrier and passenger; third,
the end of the passenger relation; fourth, a return to the duty of the carrier to
deliver the goods to the right person; and fifth, a discussion of connecting car-
riers. It is not believed that the two types of carrier relations are enough alike
to justify commingling them under these headings, simply because they both have
a beginning and an end, and both are carriers.
The last division of the book, "Liabilities of Shipper to Carrier," has a
group of striking cases on the obligation to pay freight, demurrage, and the
costs of extraordinary services, which make a satisfactory unit, and round out
the "subject.
The absence of editor's notes and references to current comment of law
review articles and similar legal discussion which we have come to expect in the
later case books is striking. This may be due to the method of selection and
editing of cases in which judicial comment on trends and development is promi-
nent. Whether there is enough material here for a satisfactory course on the
law of carriers is of course largely a matter of individual opinion. The choice
of cases and the number that are treated individually will also vary with tastes,
but there is enough difference in this selection to warrant instructors of the sub-
ject in giving it a careful examination before deciding upon a case book for
class use.
Charles E. Cullen.
School of Law, Washington University.
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WORKING MANUAL OF ORIGINAL SouncFs IN AmERICAN GoVEMEN'T. By
Milton Conover. Revised Edition. The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore,
1928. Pp. 167.
This new, enlarged edition of Prof. Conover's well-known Manual will be
welcome in all college classes on Government The author includes problems and
absignments on the Constitution, the Executive, Congress, International Affairs,
the Electorate, the Judiciary and State and Local Governments. He also adds
chapters on unofficial sources, including poems, essays and fiction, and on Political
Theory.
Prof. Conover's Manual brings the student into direct contact with original
sources of material and makes a course on Government a genuine introduction
to real government problems as they are handled by government administrators,
legislators and judges. In short, Prof. Conover gives us an inside view of Gov-
ernment The revised edition carries the author's excellent plan further into
important details of the American system. It is so arranged as to fit admirably
into any of the standard textbooks on Government and will be an indispensable
aid to faculty members and students alike. James T. Young.
University of Pennsylvania.
LAw FOR ENGINEERS AND ARCHITECTs. By Lawrence P. Simpson and Essel R.
Dillavou. West Publishing Company, St. Paul, I929. Pp. xvii, 633.
Here is a happy combination of text and case book designed primarily to
give technical students a bird's-eye view of the legal aspects of the problems with
which they will inevitably have to grapple in the practice of their profession.
In this age of intense specialization, in which, as someone has aptly re-
marked, the specialist tries to learn more and more about less and less, it is a rare
individual who is entirely master of his own chosen field of endeavor. About all
he can hope to do in some other field is to obtain a very general idea of the
aspects which will most closely affect him and his work in his own specialty.
If an engineer can acquire enough knowledge of legal principles to avoid
some of the legal pitfalls which will beset his path, his time devoted to a study
or even casual reading of this work will have been well spent Its use in classes
of technical students should in no inconsiderable measure help to give the student
some familiarity at least with some of the fundamental legal principles and help
him to avoid what may be costly blunders, and after all, this is about the most
that can be hoped for in the few hours which can be devoted to legal study by
the average technical class.
The cases used are aptly selected to illustrate the legal problems of the
student's own profession, and as far as possible the non-essential details have
been eliminated. The range of subjects treated is particularly well chosen, as
there are included, in addition to the customary sections on Contracts, Sales, and
Agency, sections on Mechanic's Liens, Regulation of Public Utilities, and Work-
men's Compensation, which are oftentimes omitted in a work of the scope of
this one, and although the book is designed primarily for the engineer, the legal
principles set forth necessarily are of general interest and application, as are
most of the cases.
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It is to be hoped, however, that use of the book will not disclose that the
authors in their zeal for compression in their statements of legal principles, and
excerpts fron the illustrative cases, have gone to the extreme they have reached
in compressing the history of the origin of legal reports into the following sen-
tence in Section 2---Sources of Law-where they baldly assert that "at a very
early time beginning with the Year Books in 1272 the Courts began to keep a
record of their decisions".
Henry D, M. Sherrerd.
Philadelphid.
THE LE AL 1FEcrs OF REtoGNrrIoN IN INTERNATIONAL LAw. By John G.
Hervey. University of Pennsylvania Press, Phila. 1928. Pp. xiv, 17O.
There are two kinds of international law, that administered by truly
international tribunals aid that laid down by courts drawing their author-
ity from some particular sovereign. The latter, to an examination of
which this book is confiried, is a crippled thing, deformed at birth by the doc-
trine, which neither those courts nor Dr. Hervey question, that the courts
must follow whenever the political arm of the government has given an
express lead either for or against recognition, Th& book is an analytical
attempt to classify the results at which tribunals, thus hamstrung, have arrived;
and if it is not always satisfactory nor clear, the difficulties of the subject may
be the cause. The scope of the book excludes criticism of the Department of
State for what it has done in regard to Russia, the nearest approach being to
say that the continued recognition of the Kerensky government motked the
truth.
We nu~t distinguish among unrecognized governments, thinks Dr. Hervey,
between those as to which our political branch has taken an express negative
attitude and those in which the failure to recognize is merely passive. The
status of the former is nil before our judiciary, whereas the latter have been
treated in three ways: priesuming the old order to continue, ignoring both the
old and the new; and taking the new into account for certain purposes, where
only private rights are at issue and public or political questions are not involved.
This third view the author fitids growing and in it sees the promise of col-
siderable relief from the difficulties attending persistent non-recognition. He
goes into the cases with keen and coi-rect analysis, clears up some possible mis-
conceptions, as, e.g., concerning The Charkleh and Mtghet v. Sidtw oft Johore,
and gives the impression of having done a thorough job.
Nevertheless it is discoricerting to find Kamett d. Chambers put among
those cases wherein the political branch has taken an express negative attitude,
and then to find it again in the chapter on passive failure to recognize. A dic-
tnm in Yticatah v. Argumedo is dealt with in the latter chapter, though one won-
ders whether it wag not really a case of express nogative attitude. These in-
itances are disturbing and make bne wonder as to the accuracy and value of this
part of his conclusions.
The main aitl most valuiable thesis of the bock is drawn from New York
cases and language of Jtidge Cardozo, that where justice and public policy
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require it, effect may be given in our courts to the acts of an unrecognized
government; and this Dr. Hervey regards as the way out of the Russian
dilemma as reducing the possibilities of international complications and yet
avoiding encroachment on the political departments.
There is a good chapter with pertinent criticism on the retroactive effect
of recognition, and an excellent one giving the author's conclusions. The book
as a whole helps to clarify the subject and will doubtless, as its author wishes,
stimulate further study and research in this field.
Hector G. Spaulding.
Law School, George Washington University.
CASES ON SutRTnSHvs. By Stephen I. Langmaid. American Casebook Series.
West Publishing Company, St. Paul, 1928. Pp. xii, 662.
Professor Langmaid has followed the plan of organization and classification
of subject matter common to most of his predecessors in casebook-making for
the subject of suretyship. He has sought distinction for his book, not by inno-
vation of form, but by careful choice and effective use of content. By economi-
cal methods of editing, he has succeeded in producing a volume of such size
that, "substantially all of it can be covered in the time usually allotted to the
course." This drastic economy, especially in respect to the number of cases and
the amount of subject matter, is in sharp contrast to the frequently followed
policy of including a generous excess of cases and topics to allow the instructor
considerable choice
The topical organization of material on the contract of the surety, in the
book under review, differs sharply from that both of Dean Arant and Professor
Henning. Professor Langmaid limits it to the Statute of Frauds, one chapter
of eighty-four pages. Professor Henning used eighty pages for substantially
the same subject matter, and in addition devoted one hundred eleven pages to
forms of, and essentials to, the formation of contracts of suretyship. Dean
Arant's treatment of the contract covers two hundred sixty-two pages, of which
one hundred forty-nine are devoted to the Statute of Frauds.
If one could agree that the only value of the material on the contract of
suretyship is to furnish a review of the essentials of the law of contracts gen-
erally, there would seem to be no compelling reason for its introduction into a
casebook on suretyship. The reviewer believes, however, that it is essential to
an effective understanding of the law of suretyship that the student grasp clearly
the distinctions between the contract of suretyship and the resulting suretyship
relation which is created by law, and out of which flow the rights and duties of
the parties. A great deal of meaningless and confusing learning has been ex-
pended in an effort to demonstrate an essential distinction between a guaranty
relationship and a surety relationship, when, in the writer's opinion, the question
is one of differences in the nature and extent of the contract obligations. If
more emphasis were placed upon the simple question of whether the personal
surety, or guarantor, has by his contract assumed the full scope of liability of
the principal obligor, or has qualified it by limitations or conditions, many of the
ICf. ANT, CASES ON SuR-TYsHip iii.
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difficulties created by such catch phrases as "a surety undertakes to pay if the
debtor does not," and, "a guarantor undertakes to pay if the debtor cannot,"
would be avoided; and further, the courts would not have to resort to such state-
ments as, "it is said to be an original undertaking and not a strict or collateral
guaranty," or, "the undertaking is in the nature of a surety," or, "the under-
taking of the appellee in this case is not a strict collateral guaranty, but is a
direct, absolute, ahd original promise to pay," in order to save themselves from
the logical inferences of prior assumptions. Consequently, the reviewer feels
that in the early presentation of the subject of suretyship there should be consid-
erable emphasis upon, and discussion of, the contract of the surety as distin-
guished from the contract of the principal obligor. -
In view of the large number of recent cases turning on the interpretation of
the contracts of corporate sureties, one might reasonably expect a new casebook
to include cases especially to present questions of interpretation and construction
of the contract of the surety. Whether or not the courts should apply to the
contract of the corporate surety any rules differing from those applied to the
contract of the personal or gratuitous surety, they have assumed, in mahy deci-
sions, that they are applying different rules of interpretation, and have further
assumed that, for the purposes of interpretations, the contract of a corporate
surety is to be treated as a contract of insurance?
The chapter on the Statute of Frauds is a remarkably fine piece of work.
The selection of cases leaves nothing to be desired, either from the historical or
the analytical standpoint, and the cases and footnotes furnish material for an
effective development of the relation between the statute and the doctrines of
suretyship. The editor has made good use of Dean Ames' test that the defend-
ant's promise is not within the Statute of Frauds if an action of debt will lie
against him, and also of Professor Henning's point that the statute is inapplica-
ble where the common law action of account would lie. The modern cases are
well chosen to show the efforts of the courts to develop a substantive test for
"special promise to/answer for the debt," etc., that will satisfy the formal re-
quireme"ts of the Statute of Frauds and avoid obvious fraud.
The pruning of the text of the cases has been done so skilfully that they
have lost little, if any, of their pedagogical value. The editor has apparently
realized his hope that, "sufficient has been retained to enable the student to appre-
ciate the fact situations, and to get a clear, undistorted understanding of the
opinion."
The footnotes contribute materially to the excellence of the book. In addi-
tion to the familiar contra and accord cases, the notes contain pertinent com-
ments and questions, with case citations, which develop the doctrine of the pri-
cipal case and ought to stimulate original thinking. The us6' of numerous anno-
tations to periodical material is commendable and'in line with modern casebook
making. Effective use hat been made of the statutes that have cut across the
field of suretyship, notably sections of the U. S. Bankruptcy Act, the Negotiable
Instruments Law, and a Missouri statute embodying the rule of Paine v.
PackardV
'Treanor, The Rationale of Corporate and Non-corporate Suretyship De-
cisions (1927) INm. L. J. io5.
I Pain v. Packard, 13 Johns. 174 (N. Y. 1816).
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The editor has not followed, "the device of propounding in the footnotes
various problems in orderly sequence,' T but he has used to good advantage many
abbreviated case problems. The reviewer believes that case problems add to the
effectiveness of a casebook as a teaching tool, and he prefers the full problem
with facts sufficient to furnish the student with material for discriminating think-
ing as a part of his regular preparation for class discussion. The reviewer also
believes that the case problems should be taken from the footnotes, accorded
typographical dignity equal to that of the cases, and raised to a parity with the
edited case itself as a part of the teaching apparatus.
The reviewer agrees with the compiler that the changes in the law of surety-
ship as applied to questions involving a corporate surety have been exaggerated;
but he also believes that these changes, such as they are, have a significance out
of proportion to the extent of- the changes themselves. In a most interesting
review of a casebook on mortgages is the following:
"Mortgage is a legal concept; that concept, in all its phases, is impor-
tant. Mortgage is also a security device: That ,fact, in all its phases, is
even more important. The legal concept is empty without its application.
The history, the steady changes of the concept are unintelligible except in
the light of the strains successively put on the concept by men's needs and
men's actions. The present meaning of this concept, its future course, are
not less unintelligible without that light." 1
Suretyship, also, is both a legal concept and a security device. The legal
concept of suretyship with its doctrinal formulas developed and became stereo-
typed at a time when, as a security device, its function was simple and much
restricted, and when the surety became such, either gratuitously and as a personal
favor, or at the most, to obtain some incidental business or personal advantage.
Modern business enterprises demand the flexibility of personal security and the
financial dependability of real security, and the corporate surety company with
its great fluid assets meets this demand. The fact situation out of which the
great body of suretyship doctrines arose has changed, at least as respects the
most important of present day suretyship transactions. There is rich pedagogi-
cal material in the corporate surety cases in view of the fact that they strikingly
reveal the judicial process wrestling with the problem of applying traditional
doctrines to the violation of a well recognized legal relation, and of avoiding at
the same time a traditional result which would be manifestly unjust in view of
essential changes in the factual basis of the legal relation. These cases give us
illuminating examples of the strain which is put on the legal concept of surety-
ship by "men's needs and men's actions." These cases, viewed in the light of
the security 'needs of modern economic life, reveal the necessity of a re-exami-
nation of traditional doctrines of the law of suretyship, with the objective of
determining whether these doctrines can be modified sufficiently to allow the
effective use of the corporate surety company as a security device under the
concept of suretyship, avoiding on the one hand the cumbersomeness and rigidity
of real security, and on the other hand the paralyzing effect of the "favorite of
the law" doctrine applied to the private gratuitous surety. Certainly something
I LANGMAID, CASES ON SUaReYSHIP (1928) vi.
' Book Review (z926) HAxv. L. Ray. 142, 145.
BOOK REVIEWS
of this sort has been happening. Cockburn, C. J., once said' that the rule that a
surety was released by a binding extension of time, however short, and regard-
less of damages, 'was "consistent with neither justice nor common sense"; but he
added that the rule had been generally established so long that it could -only be
altered by the legislature. Compare this with: "'We hold that the extension of
time of payment, unless resultant harm is shown, does not discharge a paid
surety.' .Are the courts trying to inject justice and common sense without the
aid of the legislature? Is the rule referred to hy Cockburn inapplicable to the
paid surety for the reason, as some courts have said, that the paid surety is an
insurer? Or, is the old rule yielding under the strain of "men's needs and men's
actions?
Professor Langinaid has included enough corporate surety cases to accom-
plish his purpose of indicating "the modifications of principles previously laid
down for the personal and gratuitous surety," and of "setting forth the present
view of the courts."'8 The ireviewer, however, as indicated above, favors a
broader objective, the realizatioi of which would call for a greater number of
corporate surety cases, the inclusion of an' additional topic, and considerable
supplemental material to inform students of the conditions which have created
the need for the corporate surety, of the business methods and practices of surety
companies, and of the extensive use of this type of security. The editor's ex-
pressed purpose would be none the less effectd, the fufctional content of the
suretyship course would be enriched, and the means supplied to -stimulate a criti-
cal study of "the nature o! th judicial process," and of the working of the
process in a particular situation familiar 'to, and understood by, the student.
There ought to result a clearer -ppreciation on the part of the student that as
the facts of life change, becoming more and more complex, legal doctrines nust
also change, must grow and expand, or else die. For it is true of suretyship law,
as well as of law generally, that, "The law must be stable, and yet it cannot
stand still."9
W7. E. Treanor.
School of Law, Indiana Univesity.
hEAL ESTAtg FIINACING. By I 4elson L. North, De Witt Van Buren and C.
tlliott Smith. Prefitice-Hall, Inc., Rew York, 1928. Pp. xi, 630.
Although two. of the authors of this book are lawyers, it is dear that
the text itself was not written from the lawyer's viewpoint, i. e., to help him
solve his real estate problems. While, as Will be pointed out more specifically,
the appendix contains some very helpful legal forms, it would seem that the
body of this work was intended as a general and fundamental exposition of
present day financial developinehts in the real estate world, with most of which
the practicing lawyer is already familiar.
'Swire v. Redman, I Q. B. D. 536, 541 (i876), LAkGMAID, op. cit. supra
note 4, 41I8, A1. 52.
"Sthndard Salt & Ce'meht Co. v. Nat. Suirety Co., 134 M inn. 121, 158 14. W.
862 (19r6).
8 LANGMAI, ofi. cit. -upra note 4, v.
PouND, INTREzPrATioNs oF LEGAL HrSTOiz; (Ig3) I.
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As such it outlines extensively the highly specialized financial superstruc-
ture that has been reared in the large city upon real estate values, with its ex-
pression in organized financial methods. It explains how real estate can be
financed through any one of the several kinds of indirect and guaranteed first
mortgages and through the many classes of Junior Liens, Land Contracts, Land
Trusts, Leaseholds, etc. There is a discussion of arbitration clauses in long term
leases and of the immunity of syndicate ownership from the regulation and taxa-
tion of corporations. All of this is, if not new to the lawyer, at least presented in
an organized and comparative manner, which may crystallize some of the under-
lying considerations in that field. If the authors had wished this book to be of
greater interest to lawyers they might have been more responsive to the general
need for financial and legal information in connection with certain recent devel-
opments in real estate, concerning which the law is still in the infancy of appli-
cation. Such a development, concerning which there is much interest and curios-
ity, is that of co-operative ownership. Legally what is the nature of the estate
of an owner of an apartment in a co-operative building? What legal conse-
quences have followed the creation by ingenious methods, corporate and other-
wise, of indirect individual ownership of such apartments in the face of the
impossibility of direct ownership by a division of the fee into horizontal
strata? These and many other phases of this new age in real estate are not
given sufficient consideration to make them of more than passing interest to the
profession.
The book, however, is of permanent value to the lawyer because of the
many complete forms comprising the appendix. These, although annexed to
illustrate to the general reader the modus operandi of the subject matter of
the text, are so complete and recent as to constitute a helpful reference. This
is especially true in connection with modern methods of financing real estate
enterprises by securities issues. Here will be found helpful models of the va-
rious legal instruments used in the business of underwriting and distributing real
estate securities, with all its ramifications, as it is practised today.
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